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bstract
he goal of this study is to investigate compliance with the requirements of passive transparency in city councils of Brazilian municipalities with
opulations greater than 300,000 inhabitants. The research is descriptive, operationalized by a survey with predominantly qualitative approach.
he data collected from 79 city councils were analyzed using the descriptive analysis technique. Three groups were identified in the city councils
nalyzed: first, city councils to which it was not possible to submit the request for information; second, city councils to which the request for
nformation was submitted, but there was no reply or the response was insufficient; and third, city councils to which the request for information
as submitted and there was satisfactory response. The scenario shows little passive transparency before the technological apparatus was available.
here are city councils that violate a series of legal provisions regulating the transparency of government actions. The study stands out for diagnosing
he current situation of passive transparency in the city councils of the largest Brazilian municipalities, revealing how the law, in general, can be
iolated, and not taken seriously.
 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
eywords: Transparency; Passive transparency; City councilsesumo
 estudo teve por objetivo investigar o atendimento às exigências de transparência passiva pelas câmaras de municípios brasileiros com populac¸ão
uperior a 300.000 habitantes. A pesquisa é descritiva, operacionalizada por um estudo de levantamento, com abordagem predominantemente
ualitativa. Os dados coletados com 79 câmaras municipais foram analisados pela técnica da análise descritiva. Identificaram-se três grupos nas
âmaras analisadas: o primeiro refere-se às câmaras em que não foi possível encaminhar o requerimento; o segundo diz respeito às câmaras
ujo requerimento foi encaminhado, mas não houve retorno (resposta) ou o retorno foi insuficiente; o terceiro considera às câmaras em que o
equerimento foi encaminhado e houve retorno satisfatório. É um cenário que revela pouca transparência passiva diante de um aparato tecnológico
isponível. Há câmaras que descumprem uma sucessão de textos legais que regulamentam a transparência dos atos governamentais. O estudo se∗ Corresponding author at: Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina, Avenida Madre Benvenuta, 2037, 88035-001, Florianópolis, SC, Brazil.
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destaca por diagnosticar a atual situac¸ão da transparência passiva de câmaras dos maiores municípios brasileiros e revela como a lei, em geral,
pode ser descumprida, não levada à sério.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palavras-chave: Transparência; Transparência passiva; Câmaras municipais
Resumen
El objeto del estudio es analizar la atención a las exigencias de transparencia pasiva por parte de las cámaras de los municipios brasilen˜os con
población superior a 300.000 habitantes. Se llevó a cabo el estudio descriptivo por medio de un análisis predominantemente cualitativo. Los datos
obtenidos en las 79 cámaras municipales fueron analizados por la técnica de análisis descriptivo. Se identificaron tres grupos en las cámaras
estudiadas: el primero se refiere a las cámaras en las que no fue posible tramitar la petición; el segundo se refiere a las cámaras en que se tramitó
la petición, pero no hubo respuesta o la misma fue insuficiente, y el tercero considera a las cámaras en las que se tramitó la petición y hubo una
respuesta satisfactoria. Es un escenario que indica poca transparencia pasiva delante de la tecnología disponible. Existen cámaras que no cumplen
con una sucesión de textos legales que regulan la transparencia de los actos gubernamentales. El estudio se destaca por diagnosticar la situación
actual de la transparencia pasiva de las cámaras de los mayores municipios brasilen˜os, y muestra como la ley, en general, puede ser incumplida y
no ser plenamente respetada.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este es un artı´culo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Although the term transparency is recent and it has been
ighlighted in recent years, the concern related to the term has
 long history. The formation of the liberal state and repre-
entative democracies encouraged the fight against the opacity
hat prevailed in monarchical regimes and the establishment of
ccountability of the executive by the legislature (Zuccolotto &
eixeira, 2014). For the authors, despite the importance given to
he issue in the past decade, its meaning remains fluid, display-
ng variations among different areas of knowledge. In part, this
s due to the fact that this concept is used in different aspects
elated to the flow of information.
Zuccolotto and Teixeira (2014) also highlight the low level of
ransparency shown by subnational Brazilian states, indicating
 significant distance between the government and civil soci-
ty, as little information is released by the states. Therefore,
here is a gap between the requirements imposed on government
ntities regarding active transparency (providing information,
egardless of request) and the effective application by the public
anagers. Without wanting to justify non-compliance with legal
equirements, some questions are raised: Would passive trans-
arency (information provided in reply to citizens’ requests) be
ne way to mitigate the failure of governments in relation to
he transparency of actions taken in public administration? As
t happens to active transparency, is there failure in relation to
assive transparency as well?
In terms of academic papers, in a survey done in SPELL base
 Scientific Electronic Library Periodicals (www.spell.org.br)
n February 6, 2015, using as a search parameter the term
transparency” in the document title, we identified 44 papers
pecifically on transparency, published in journals, but no work
ddressed passive transparency. Using the same parameters, on
i
b
f
That same date, we made a survey concerning the issues of the
vents organized by ANPAD – National Association of Gradu-
te Studies and Research in Administration (www.anpad.org.br),
nd we identified 35 studies that include the word “transparency”
n their titles. However, we did not identify any study that
ddressed passive transparency. Such surveys reveal a gap in
his area of knowledge, contributing to justify this study from
n academic point of view. Therefore, the relevance and perti-
ence of the study lies in three main reasons: firstly, the results
ay contribute to a situational diagnosis of passive transparency
egarding the suitability or not of this instrument to legisla-
ion (Raupp, Andrade, & Pinho, 2015); secondly, it is sustained
y the fact that active transparency is not yet a reality in the
razilian context (Araujo & Grossi, 2013; Bairral, Silva, &
lvez, 2015; Cruz, Ferreira, Silva, & Macedo, 2012; Raupp &
inho, 2011; Leite Filho, Colares, & Andrade, 2015; Raupp,
014a, 2014b; Souza, Costa Barros, Araujo, & Silva, 2013;
taroscky, Nunes, Leão Lyrio, & Lunkes, 2014; Zuccolotto &
eixeira, 2014), a scenario that encourages research aimed to
nvestigate whether passive transparency can be one way to
itigate this problem; thirdly, related to the second reason, it
oncerns the gap caused by the lack of studies on passive trans-
arency.
These are the reasons that anchor the following research
uestion: To what extent is passive transparency found in
razilian city councils of municipalities with a population over
00,000 inhabitants? Therefore, the study aimed to investigate
ompliance with the requirements of passive transparency in
ity councils of municipalities with a population of 300,000
nhabitants or more. The paper is organized into five sections,
eginning with this introduction. It is followed by the theoretical
oundation, considered necessary to support the research object.
he third section covers the adopted methodological procedures.
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he following sections present the research findings and final
onsiderations, respectively.
heoretical  foundation
The theoretical foundations cover discussions on trans-
arency, active and passive transparency and the use of
nformation and communication technologies – ICT to promote
ransparency. It also refers to formalism and paternalism as pos-
ible explanations for the gap between the requirements imposed
n government entities regarding transparency and the effective
mplementation by the leaders.
It is observed that many changes concerning transparency
ave occurred over the past 20 years. On one hand, if it can-
ot yet be said that the veil of Brazilian government has been
emoved completely, on the other, it should be recognized that
he current scenario is completely different from 20 years ago,
s pointed out by Campos (1990), which can cause an increase
f accountability or, at least, create conditions for that to take
lace (Pinho & Sacramento, 2009). The relationship between
ransparency and the meaning of accountability is evident in the
tudy of Pinho and Sacramento (2009), who looked up the mean-
ng of the word accountability  in several dictionaries in order to
ry to grasp more precisely what the term means in English
nd how it has been translated into Portuguese. Due to the
ack of a word in Portuguese that expresses what accountability
eans, the authors infer that the meaning of the concept involves
esponsibility (objective and subjective), control, transparency,
bligation of accountability, justifications for the actions that
ave been or ceased to be undertaken, awards and/or punishment
Pinho & Sacramento, 2009). Before moving to the Brazilian sit-
ation in particular, it is worth bringing the reflections of Behn
1998), who introduced the discussion of accountability within
he emerging paradigm of the new public management in the
id-1990s in the American context. For the author, the “problem
f corruption” would be less disturbing than the “performance
ssue” (Behn, 1998, p. 6). Thus, the “emphasis on producing
esults” becomes predominant (Behn, 1998, p. 7) and that calls
or a “democratic accountability”. It is worth stating that Behn
1998) points out many problems and difficulties in building
n effective accountability, which leads to realizing that this
oncept is difficult to operationalize even within the American
ontext, regarded as an advanced democracy. The author shows
he difficulties of allocating responsibilities to public officials
nvolved with public policies, as well as difficulties related to
he capacity of civil society to mobilize itself concerning that
ssue.
The entities that make up the Brazilian government struc-
ure are required, by the Federal Constitution (Brasil, 1988),
o provide accountability on the use of public funds and to
espect the principle of publicity, among other principles of pub-
ic administration. Therefore, it is evident that there is need for
ransparency in the accountability of public entities and their
odies in direct and indirect administration (Neto, da Cruz,
nsslin, & Ensslin, 2007). The public sector is compelled to
erve the collective interest and, therefore, it should increase the
evel of transparency so that citizens can see the accountability
t
o
s
rministração 51 (2016) 288–298
nd check its performance meets the collective interest (Silva,
ereira, & Araújo, 2014).
For Neto et al. (2007), there are three elements of trans-
arency of public accounts: publicity, understandability and
sefulness for decisions. By publicity, Neto et al. (2007)
ean the wide dissemination of information to the population,
roviding low-cost access to multiple media in a language under-
tandable for users. The authors presuppose the opportunity of
he information provided, with timing, and within feasible time
o support the decisions. The comprehensibility dimension is
elated, according to the authors, to visual presentation, includ-
ng information format (statements, reports), and the use of an
dequate language. Simplicity and accessible language, targeted
o the profile of users, should be pursued to increase understand-
ng of the information. The usefulness for decisions is based on
he relevance of the information. The relevance, in turn, may
r may not coincide with users’ interests. Associated with rele-
ance, there is the reliability of the information to which users
ave access, that is, the accuracy guarantee of what is disclosed.
omparability should be fostered amongst periods and amongst
ntities (Neto et al., 2007).
Within the legal perspective, laws concerning access to
nformation detail how government bodies should proactively
rovide information to the public, and they also specify how
overnments should deal with requests for information, pointing
ut the structures for receiving such requests, the appeal systems
nd punitive measures for those who do not comply (Angélico
 Teixeira, 2012). In recent years, it has been possible to iden-
ify a large increase of Access to Information Laws around the
orld, with more than two-thirds of the approximately 100 laws
f this kind being adopted only in the past decade. In Latin
merica, only Venezuela and Costa Rica have not legislated
n access to information. Brazil was one of the last countries
o join this movement for transparency (Michener, Moncau, &
elasco, 2014). The Brazilian Access to Information Law, sanc-
ioned on November 18th, 2011, was the 89th national law of
hat kind. The text established 180 days for the beginning of
ts validity; therefore, it was indeed applicable in Brazil as of
ay 16th, 2012 (Angélico & Teixeira, 2012). Raupp (2014a)
elieves that the publication of the Access to Information Law –
AI (Brasil, 2011) reinforces the need for transparency for pub-
ic officials, present in the Fiscal Responsibility Law (Brasil,
000) and the Transparency Law (Brasil, 2009). The LAI estab-
ished the duty of the Government to spontaneously disclose
nformation of public interest (active transparency), and meet
he demands that are made by the population (passive trans-
arency) (Silva, Hoch, & Santos, 2013). The rules of LAI apply
o all public bodies, which are part of the direct administration of
he Executive, Legislative and Judicial Powers and Autonomous
odies as well as public companies, joint-stock companies and
ther entities of indirect public administration (Michener et al.,
014).
Active transparency is one in which the disclosure of informa-
ion occurs as an initiative of the government entity, regardless
f request, as established by the law. The article 8 of the LAI
tates that “it is the duty of public bodies and entities to promote,
egardless of request, the disclosure in a place with easy access,
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ithin their competencies, of information of collective or gen-
ral interest produced by them or under their custody” (Brasil,
011). In compliance with art. 8, government bodies and enti-
ies “shall use all means and legitimate instruments available to
hem, being it mandatory the disclosure in official sites” (Brasil,
011). The disclosure of information shall contain at least:
[. . .] II – records of any transfers or transfers of financial
resources; III – records of expenses; IV – information con-
cerning bidding procedures, including the respective notices
and results, as well as all contracts; V – general data for
monitoring programs, actions, projects and works of bodies
and entities; and VI – answers to society’s frequently asked
questions (Brasil, 2011).
Passive transparency is one in which the information is made
vailable according to the demands of society. The article 10 of
he LAI mentions that “any interested party may submit request
or access to information to bodies and entities referred to in art.
 of this Law, by any legitimate means, and the application must
ontain the identification of the applicant and the specification
f the required information.” For the application of art. 10 of
AI, the governmental entity should consider:
§  1st For access to information of public interest, the iden-
tification of the applicant may not contain requirements that
hinder the request; §  2nd The bodies and entities of pub-
lic power must enable alternative ways to forward access
requests through their official websites on the Internet; and §
3rd any requirements for determining reasons for the request
for information of public interest are forbidden.
The article 11 of the Law states that “the public body or entity
ust authorize or grant immediate access to information”. If
mmediate access is not possible, §  1 of art. 11 advocates that
he body or entity receiving the request shall, within a period not
xceeding twenty (20) days:
I – communicate the date, place and way to perform the query,
perform the reproduction or obtain the certificate; II – state the
reasons, de  facto  or de  jure, for the refusal of all or part of the
intended access; or III – report that it does not have the infor-
mation, indicate, if possible, the body or entity which holds
such information, or even forward the application to that body
or entity, notifying the interested party of the submission of
his/her information request.
With the Information and Communication Technologies –
CT, especially the Internet, the duty of passive transparency
f the State, mechanism by which a citizen requests access to
nformation, can be widely used by public power, ensuring more
apid and less bureaucratized responses (Silva et al., 2013). The
pread of ICT enables, therefore, the implementation of instru-
ents in order to make more efficient government management.
ts spread to many sectors of the State, such as the Legislative
nd Executive Powers, aims at the same goals: greater efficiency
nd transparency (Raupp & Pinho, 2011).
The discussion on transparency of government actions is
ssociated, therefore, to the rapid growth and technological
evelopment of computer and communication device industries
a
o
o
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Akutsu & Pinho, 2002). For the authors, the citizen can access
his information using the Internet, which allows access from
nywhere in the world, 24 h a day, and which might be one of
he most effective tools to build a more effective democracy
Akutsu & Pinho, 2002). Most government bodies have now
omepages, providing information on policies, projects and gov-
rnment actions, in addition to offering services to citizens. This
ossibility of interaction and provision of government services
o the society, known as e-government, constitutes an instrument
o assist the government to perform its functions in an integrated,
fficient and transparent manner, providing it a more democratic
haracter, oriented to the citizens. However, it is noteworthy that
CT can facilitate transparency and participation, but it is unable
o ban the existence of democratic deficit and accountability
tself (Cruz et al., 2012).
Despite the fact that modern ICT makes it possible, building
ransparency tools (the so-called electronic government, trans-
arency websites, etc.) is a political process that is effective in
he context of democratization and the need for political legit-
macy of rulers. On the other hand, the institutionalization of
overnment transparency also relates to the country’s integra-
ion into the global economy and the consequent requirements
or balance of public accounts, necessary for the solvency and
redibility of the government for the financial market; which,
n turn, triggers restructuring and modernization actions of the
tate apparatus (Loureiro, Teixeira, & Prado, 2008).
Governments can use transparency websites to disclose a
ange of information on the Internet, which become available
or access to society as a whole. However, for a more transpar-
nt and efficient public administration, it is necessary to move
o levels beyond those set by legislation (Staroscky et al., 2014).
espite legal obligations, transparency is closely related to the
willingness to inform” or even responsibility to be accountable
s a result of the responsibility for the management of pub-
ic resources. Transparency plays the role of bringing the State
nd society together and expanding the citizen’s level of access
o information on public management (Cruz et al., 2012). It is
een as a necessary factor for accountability and, hence, for
he consolidation of democracy. Even if its importance is often
ighlighted, its causes are still unknown, especially within the
razilian context (Zuccolotto & Teixeira, 2014).
Even with the expectations generated from the use of ICT,
everal academic papers (Akutsu & Pinho, 2002; Gondin &
aupp, 2015; Justice, 2006; Pérez, Bolívar, & Hernandez, 2008;
inho, 2008; Styles & Tennyson, 2007; Zuccolotto & Teixeira,
014) have found a gap between the transparency requirements
mposed on government entities and effective compliance by
heir leaders. This scenario moves toward a “more institutional
ormalization of democracy and the search for control over the
stablished powers” (Raupp & Pinho, 2012, p. 5). In this con-
ext, it is appropriate to insert the theoretical construction of
ormalism to explain this situation. In order to contextualize
his theoretical construct, it is appropriate to point out that,
fter the war, there were several technical missions from devel-
ped countries to Latin America, Asia and Africa in order to
vercome “the backwardness and underdevelopment” (Santos,
ouza Santos, & Braga, 2013). Without discussing the adequacy
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r not of such initiatives, it is worth saying that the results showed
hat “[in] the underdeveloped nations, nothing seemed to work
s planned” (Santos et al., 2013). An important contribution
o the understanding of this issue has been found in the stud-
es by Fred Riggs about prismatic societies on the idea that the
evelopment resonates differently in peripheral countries. Thus,
onventional theoretical models developed to societies based on
homogeneous social structures and prescribed norms”, when
ransferred to societies based on a “strong degree of heterogene-
ty, formalism and overlay, such models will be of little use”
Santos et al., 2013). Not aiming at exhausting Riggs’s formu-
ation, this text will focus on the issue of formalism. According
o Riggs (Ramos, 1983, p. 252), formalism is shown as “the
issociation between the actual conduct and the prescribed rule
hich is supposed to regulate it.” According to Riggs, formal-
sm is expressed by the discrepancy between what is prescribed
nd what is described, between what is present in the constitu-
ion, laws and even in the statistics and what actually happens
Santos et al., 2013). It is as if there were a real world and
 world of laws, of legal systems. Failure to comply with the
ules, within the formalist systems, does not imply sanctions on
iolators. There is a discrepancy between what the norm pre-
cribes and what actually occurs in social practices by both the
overnment and society (Raupp & Pinho, 2012). The concept of
ormalism, according to Raupp and Pinho (2012), is helpful to
rasp the meaning of homepages, an instrument imported from
ore developed realities, which are built, within the Brazilian
eality, much more for the sake of displaying an adjustment to
arameters of advanced democracies, but which, in reality, are
ar from effectively functioning, since they do not find support
n social practices historically constructed by society.
For Machado-da-Silva (2003), in societies such as Brazil,
here is the influence of foreign models, which are adopted by
ecree or by law rather than based on predominant social behav-
or. The choice of external standard, according to the authors,
eveals the expression of formalism, which becomes an institu-
ional mechanism of regulation and legal sanction. Formalism
anifests itself when the rules cease to be observed, with-
ut mandatory sanctions. The case of websites, according to
aupp and Pinho (2012), manifests an expression of formalism,
ince there is the importation of a control mechanism of society
ver the existing powers, which is distant from the reality of
he Brazilian society’s behavior. Riggs viewed three stages of
ociety’s evolution: traditional, transitional and modern (Santos
t al., 2013). Brazil, even nowadays, not just at the time of
iggs’s formulation, is included in the transitional stage; it is
ot modern yet, but it is still traditional, as seen below.
It is believed that the distance between the behavior of gov-
rnment officials and legal transparency requirements is also
ased on patrimonialist elements, due to the reluctance to dis-
lose information. For Akutsu and Pinho (2002), the potential
f the Internet to enable the effective exercise of citizenship
hould be considered in the light of structural features of soci-
ty and of the State in Brazil, such as patrimonialism. Based
n Weber, patrimonialism means the inability or reluctance of
he prince, to distinguish between the public and the private
pheres (Bresser Pereira, 1997). Schwartzman (1988) has argued
o
m
u
wministração 51 (2016) 288–298
hat Brazil can be better explained within a Weberian frame-
ork rather than a Marxist one, considering the existence of
omponents based on traditional leaders, still powerful, who
o not follow what is dictated by class structures and mod-
rn societies. For the author, modern patrimonial regimes are
alled neo-patrimonialists, which is not simply survival of tra-
itional structures, but a current form of political domination by
 social stratum with no property and that has no social honor
ased on merit. The author also argues that it is within a Webe-
ian framework that one can see that the Brazilian State has
s its predominant historical characteristic its neo-patrimonial
imension.
The resistance of patrimonialism can be observed, which is
ble to absorb modernizing changes in Brazilian society. The
eo-patrimonialism is able not only to give life to patrimo-
ialism, but also, so it seems, to strengthen itself, even when
he economic situation undergoes considerable changes (Pinho,
998). Thus, the problem is not of technology, but of political
ulture, of political development. There is a lot of technology,
ven though it can and should be expanded, but little democ-
acy, because the technology that could be used for democratic
mprovement is not aimed at doing so (Pinho, 2008). In other
ords, it is implanted what is most modern and advanced in
elation to the law, but more structural characteristics of soci-
ty and the State itself conspire against the effectiveness of the
aw.
In relation to that, it seems appropriate to assert that patrimo-
ialism instills itself in several aspects of the Brazilian political
ife. Thus, in addition to generating “a promiscuous relation-
hip between (what should be) public and private space”, where
ublic space, seen as the “extension of private space”, becomes
no man’s land, assets to be captured or goods which can be
ilapidated” (Sorj, 2001, p. 31). Such persistent phenomenon
f the Brazilian reality, given this configuration, also affects the
pplication of the law. Thus, “the feeling of impunity and the
rrogance of the dominant groups converge to weaken the for-
ation of a public space and strengthen an attitude of contempt
oward the law” (Sorj, 2001, p. 31). And, here, there is an inver-
ion. If, in general, “customs become laws and laws become
ostoms. In Brazil, the custom is not to take the laws seriously”
Sorj, 2001, p. 31). That is to say, the law exists, it is established,
ut it takes a long way for the law to be actually applied, to see
hether it will actually “catch on”, or whether it will be taken
eriously. There seems to be the awareness of some comfort in
ot following the law, ensured by the ineffectiveness of the appli-
ation of the law, the so-called enforcement, a vital component
or accountability.
ethodological  procedures
This research is descriptive and it was operationalized by a
urvey study. The approach to the problem is predominantly
ualitative. The empirical object refers to the city councils
f municipalities with a population of 300,000 inhabitants or
ore. Some reasons justify the option for cities with this pop-
lation size. First, according to Raupp (2014a), municipalities
ith larger size should have better conditions (financial, human
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esources) to build more developed websites, even contemplat-
ng the issue of accountability. A second reason relates to the
act that the contact with a city council member in larger cities,
hen there is any, is more virtual than live, and what would be
resented to civil society live shall be disclosed on the websites,
nd the digital media is responsible for welcoming suggestions
nd answering citizens’ questions (Raupp & Pinho, 2013a). The
hird reason relates to the fact that this group of municipalities
ncludes most state capitals and, according to Raupp (2014b),
n the capitals, there is the expectation that the computer facil-
ty processes in the city councils be older and more mature,
roviding councilors adequate infrastructure. The name of the
unicipalities, population size and electronic address of the city
ouncils are shown in Table 1.
Considering the option to investigate municipalities with
opulations greater than 300,000, we ended up with 79 city
ouncils, based on the Census (2010) of the Brazilian Institute
f Geography and Statistics – IBGE. The addresses of elec-
ronic websites were identified on February 2nd, 2015, based on
oogle; however, the electronic address of one city council was
ot found.
After identifying the municipalities and the electronic
ddresses of their city councils, the stage of data collection was
tarted. Based on the theme passive transparency, in which the
itizen makes a request for information to a governmental entity,
e designed a single application to be forwarded to the city coun-
ils, with the following content: “Considering the assumptions
f Law No. 12,527/2011, I request a list of all contracts with
 waiver of bidding in 2014, with details of value and mode of
aiver of the bidding process.” This is a relevant issue, which
an direct the way by which part of the expenses is incurred by
ity councils and which has been the object of recurring trans-
ressions of law, in general, in all the spheres of the res  publica.
he request was sent to the city councils on February 6th and
th, 2015. It was possible to forward the request to 68 councils,
sing an electronic form for 38 of them and e-mail (obtained in
he electronic website) for 30. For 11 city councils, it was not
ossible to forward the request due to problems with the website.
The collected data were analyzed using the descriptive
nalysis technique, which, according to Contradiopoulos,
hampagne, Potvin, Denis, and Boyle, 1994, serves to explain
he behavior of a variable, in this case the (un)fulfillment of
assive transparency, in a given population: the city councils of
unicipalities with a population of 300,000 inhabitants or more.
lectronic spreadsheets were used to tabulate the data.
The construction of the research entails some limitations. The
rst one refers to the selected cases, conducting the research
ndings to the empirical object investigated, without general-
zations to other city councils or entities from other spheres in
razil. The second limitation is related to the lack of studies
n the subject, especially related to passive transparency, mak-
ng it difficult to compare results to other references. The third
imitation is related to the speed changes of ICT and the very
nformation and services available in the websites, i.e., the data
ndicate the reality of the collection period. In addition, there is
he fact that few studies are devoted to the work of the municipal
egislature, to the rules that determine the process of interaction
t
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etween the executive and legislative powers, and to how the
ctions of the political actors of the local legislature are guided
Kerbauy, 2005).
esults
The results identified three groups in the analyzed city coun-
ils: the first refers to the city councils where it was not possible
o submit the application; the second concerns the city councils
o which the application was submitted, but there was no reply
r the response was insufficient; the third one encompasses the
ity councils to which the application was submitted and there
as satisfactory response. The names of the city councils were
oded to preserve anonymity. After the individual analysis, an
ssessment of the (in) transparency in the investigated websites
as carried out.
he  infringement  at  the  source
The LAI, in its art. 10, §  1, states that “the bodies and enti-
ies of public power should enable NA option for routing access
equests through their official websites on the Internet.” Out of
he 79 investigated city councils, 11 did not meet the determined
riteria: in 3 websites (T2, J3 and V3), it was not possible to find
n electronic form and/or contact e-mail to forward the request;
he e-mail sent to two city councils (S1 and G2) returned twice;
n 2 websites (O1 and F3), an electronic form was found, how-
ver, it was not possible to send it; in two other websites (A3
nd S3), we could not access the page content; 1 website (H2)
as being developed; and the e-mail address of one city council
as not found (A4). It is surprising that this group includes five
razilian state capitals and other city councils located in large
ities in more developed regions. In other words, it should not
e expected to find problems of technological resource limita-
ions in these city councils. Considering the 5 Brazilian Regions,
here are 2 municipalities in the North, 7 in the Northeast, and
 in the Southeast. In this group, there are no municipalities
n the South and Midwest. Noteworthy is the concentration of
unicipalities in the Northeast (63.64% of the group), although
t should be highlighted that out of the total set (79 munici-
alities), this region has 17 (21.52%) municipalities. The fact
hat the Northeast Region does not display the largest number
f municipalities in the whole set could lead to the assumption
hat it should not present the largest number of municipalities
n this group. Since this is a group of municipalities that do not
ave channels for requesting information, it is assumed that the
echnological development is not as intense in the Northeast as
ompared to the other regions.
If there are no technological conditions, as properly struc-
ured websites, citizens cannot send the information request.
his is a group of city councils in which the infringement occurs
t the source, which does not allow the public entity to become
ware of the need for information, for instance, the websites
hat have an electronic form, but in which it was not possible
o send it. It is worth wondering whether the technicians who
tructured the website had already done tests to make sure that
he form works. A similar situation occurs with the e-mails that
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Table 1
Municipalities, population size and electronic address of the city councils.
N. Municipality Populationa Electronic addressb
1 São Paulo – SP 11,253,503 <www.camara.sp.gov.br>
2 Rio de Janeiro – RJ 6,320,446 <www.camara.rj.gov.br>
3 Salvador – BA 2,675,656 <www.cms.ba.gov.br>
4 Brasília – DF 2,570,160 <www.cl.df.gov.br>
5 Fortaleza – CE 2,452,185 <www.cmfor.ce.gov.br>
6 Belo Horizonte – MG 2,375,151 <www.cmbh.mg.gov.br>
7 Manaus – AM 1,802,014 <www.cmm.am.gov.br>
8 Curitiba – PR 1,751,907 <www.cmc.pr.gov.br>
9 Recife – PE 1,537,704 <www.recife.pe.leg.br>
10 Porto Alegre – RS 1,409,351 <www.camarapoa.rs.gov.br>
11 Belém – PA 1,393,399 <www.cmb.pa.gov.br>
12 Goiânia – GO 1,302,001 <www.camara.go.gov.br>
13 Guarulhos – SP 1,221,979 <www.camaraguarulhos.sp.gov.br>
14 Campinas – SP 1,080,113 <www.campinas.sp.leg.br>
15 São Luís – MA 1,014,837 <www.saoluis.ma.leg.br>
16 São Gonc¸alo – RJ 999,728 <www.camaradesaogoncalo.rj.gov.br>
17 Maceió – AL 932,748 <www.camarademaceio.al.gov.br>
18 Duque de Caxias – RJ 855,048 <www.cmdc.rj.gov.br>
19 Teresina – PI 814,230 <www.teresina.pi.leg.br>
20 Natal – RN 803,739 <www.cmnat.rn.gov.br>
21 Nova Iguac¸u – RJ 796,257 <www.cmni.rj.gov.br>
22 Campo Grande – MS 786,797 <www.camara.ms.gov.br>
23 São Bernardo do Campo – SP 765,463 <www.camarasbc.sp.gov.br>
24 João Pessoa – PB 723,515 <www.cmjp.pb.gov.br>
25 Santo André – SP 676,407 <www.cmsandre.sp.gov.br>
26 Osasco – SP 666,740 <www.camaraosasco.sp.gov.br>
27 Jaboatão dos Guararapes – PE 644,620 <www.camarajaboatao.pe.gov.br>
28 São José dos Campos – SP 629,921 <www.camarasjc.sp.gov.br>
29 Ribeirão Preto – SP 604,682 <www.camararibeiraopreto.sp.gov.br>
30 Uberlândia – MG 604,013 <www.camarauberlandia.mg.gov.br>
31 Contagem – MG 603,442 <www.cmc.mg.gov.br>
32 Sorocaba – SP 586,625 <www.camarasorocaba.sp.gov.br>
33 Aracaju – SE 571,149 <www.cmaju.se.gov.br>
34 Feira de Santana – BA 556,642 <www.camarafeiradesantana.ba.gov.br>
35 Cuiabá – MT 551,098 <www.camaracba.mt.gov.br>
36 Juiz de Fora – MG 516,247 <www.camarajf.mg.gov.br>
37 Joinville – SC 515,288 <www.cvj.sc.gov.br>
38 Londrina – PR 506,701 <www.cml.pr.gov.br>
39 Niterói – RJ 487,562 <www.camaraniteroi.rj.gov.br>
40 Ananindeua – PA 471,980 <www.cma.pa.gov.br>
41 Belford Roxo – RJ 469,332 <www.cmbr.rj.gov.br>
42 Campos dos Goytacazes – RJ 463,731 <www.camaracampos.rj.gov.br>
43 São João de Meriti – RJ 458,673 <www.camaradesaojoaodemeriti.rj.gov.br>
44 Aparecida de Goiânia – GO 455,657 <www.camaradeaparecida.go.gov.br>
45 Caxias do Sul – RS 435,564 <www.camaracaxias.rs.gov.br>
46 Porto Velho – RO 428,527 <www.portovelho.ro.leg.br>
47 Florianópolis – SC 421,240 <www.cmf.sc.gov.br>
48 Santos – SP 419,400 <www.camarasantos.sp.gov.br/publico>
49 Mauá – SP 417,064 <www.camaramaua.sp.gov.br>
50 Vila Velha – ES 414,586 <www.cmvv.es.gov.br>
51 Serra – ES 409,267 <www.camaraserra.web470.uni5.net/>
52 São José do Rio Preto - SP 408,258 <www.riopreto.sp.leg.br>
53 Macapá – AP 398,204 <www.cmm.ap.gov.br>
54 Mogi das Cruzes – SP 387,779 <www.cmmc.sp.gov.br>
55 Diadema – SP 386,089 <www.cmdiadema.sp.gov.br>
56 Campina Grande – PB 385,213 <www.camaracg.pb.gov.br>
57 Betim – MG 378,089 <www.camarabetim.mg.gov.br>
58 Olinda – PE 377,779 <www.camaraolinda.pe.gov.br>
59 Jundiaí – SP 370,126 <www.jundiai.sp.leg.br>
60 Carapicuíba – SP 369,584 <www.camaracarapicuiba.sp.gov.br>
61 Piracicaba – SP 364,571 <www.camarapiracicaba.sp.gov.br>
62 Montes Claros – MG 361,915 <www.cmmoc.mg.gov.br>
63 Maringá – PR 357,077 <www.cmm.pr.gov.br>
64 Cariacica – ES 348,738 <www.camaracariacica.es.gov.br>
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Table 1 (Continued)
N. Municipality Populationa Electronic addressb
65 Bauru – SP 343,937 <www.camarabauru.sp.gov.br>
66 Rio Branco – AC 336,038 <www.riobranco.ac.leg.br/cmrb2013>
67 Anápolis – GO 334,613 <www.camaraanapolis.go.gov.br>
68 São Vicente – SP 332,445 <www.camarasaovicente.sp.gov.br>
69 Pelotas – RS 328,275 <www.camarapel.rs.gov.br>
70 Vitória – ES 327,801 <www.cmv.es.gov.br>
71 Caucaia – CE 325,441 <www.cmcaucaia.ce.gov.br>
72 Canoas – RS 323,827 <www.camaracanoas.rs.gov.br>
73 Itaquaquecetuba – SP 321,770 <www.camaraitaquaquecetuba.sp.gov.br>
74 Franca – SP 318,640 <www.camarafranca.sp.gov.br>
75 Caruaru – PE 314,912 <www.camaracaruaru.pe.gov.br/2013>
76 Ponta Grossa – PR 311,611 <www.cmpg.pr.gov.br>
77 Blumenau – SC 309,011 <www.camarablu.sc.gov.br>
78 Vitória da Conquista – BA 306,866 <www.camaravc.com.br/site>
79 Paulista – PE 300,466 Not found
Source:
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ere sent, but were returned to sender. City councils with no
ebsites, with websites under maintenance, or with no possi-
ility of access infringe even the active transparency, because,
ccording to art. 8, government bodies “should use all legitimate
eans and instruments available to them, with mandatory dis-
losure on official websites”. This already shows the state of the
rt of the empirical object investigated here.
We observed that these websites do not have adequate tech-
ological resources, since they do not display the necessary
onditions to allow for information request. It is possible to say
hat technology is a problem in this group, since it is not a mech-
nism by which the citizen requests access to information (Silva
t al., 2013). This situation seems to contradict Pinho’s argu-
ent (2008) that there is enough technology, but not enough
emocracy. However, it can also be suggested the hypothesis
hat technology, in this case the lack of it, can be an obstacle
or democracy. In other words, to prevent the achievement of
emocracy, technological constraints are created, being it easier
o give explanations on technological limitations rather than on
imitations on the exercise of democracy. There is not any con-
truction of passive transparency tools made possible by ICT
Loureiro et al., 2008). Similarly, it is difficult to figure out
rogress to levels beyond those set by the law when the govern-
ent entity does not meet even the minimum criterion: the legal
equirement (Staroscky et al., 2014.). The websites do exist, but
heir existence seems only to meet a requirement of the moder-
ity, necessary to legitimize the city councils in relation to the
ominant technological standard (Raupp & Pinho, 2013b).
he  infringement  continues
The second group of city councils includes those to which the
equest was submitted, but there was no reply or it was insuffi-
ient, considering the time period established by law. Sending
he request was successful to 68 city councils. Out of these, 56
ailed to comply with legal requirements and demonstrated lack
f ability to facilitate passive transparency, since:
h
i
t
2 47 city councils did not reply, B1, E1, F1, I1, J1, K1, L1, M1,
N1, P1, Q1, R1, T1, U1, V1, W1, X1, Y1, A2, B2, D2, F2, I2,
J2, M2, N2, O2, P2, R2, S2, U2, Y2, Z2, B3, C3, D3, E3, K3,
L3, N3 O3 P3, Q3, U3, W3, X3 and Z3;
 08 city councils contacted us, but they did not respond to the
request: A1, G1, Z1, C2, L2, Q2, V2, and R3;
 01 city council responded unsatisfactorily: E2.
Regarding the Brazilian Regions, there were 4 municipali-
ies in the North, 9 in the Northeast, 7 in the South, 31 in the
outheast, and 5 municipalities in the Midwest. This set vir-
ually provides a mosaic of the entire country, obviously with
ore emphasis and participation of municipalities in the South-
ast, where urbanization occurs more intensely, but it does not
void taking place in all regions. Even displaying channels for
nformation request, these municipalities did not respond to the
equest made, which emphatically demonstrates that it is use-
ess to have technological apparatus, in compliance with digital
odernity, if it is not used for a higher purpose, in this case
ontributing to develop transparency channels.
Even having the necessary technology and the possibility to
orward the request for information, the number of city councils
hat did not return the submitted request is significant. A smaller
et of city councils (08) contacted us after receiving the request,
aying they would provide the information; however, they did
ot forward the reply within the time limit set by the LAI. It is
oteworthy that, among the city councils that replied, but sent no
ater response, many demanded identification with personal doc-
ments so that information could be made available. Some even
equested that the request be made in  loco, at the city council’s
eadquarters. These are possible barriers to access information.
As far as the city council whose response was regarded as
nsatisfactory, they sent the following text: “The response we
ave gotten from the Procurement Department is that their duty
s to publish in the Diário  Oﬁcial  (.  .  .) in the Legislative sec-
ion. Therefore, if you have so much interest, please, consult the
014 Diário  Oﬁcial. Sincerely, (.  . .)”. It was known that such
2  de Administração 51 (2016) 288–298
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Table 2
Synthesis of the passive (in)transparency in city councils.
City council groups N. Percentage
No possibility of sending the request 11 13.92%
No reply or insufficient response to the request 56 70.89%
Satisfactory response to the request 12 15.19%
Total 79 100.00%
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nformation could be accessed in the Diário  Oﬁcial. However,
onsidering the publication of one year (2014), there were too
any pages that should be read to find the requested information.
e argue that being transparent also means facilitating access
o information and making it available so that it is easy to locate,
s stated by Neto et al. (2007).
In this set of city councils, websites take an electronic wall
rofile, but they should be a space for transparency instead. They
espond to a request, a boost of modernity, expressed by a dom-
nant technological demand, but they do not contribute to the
evelopment of transparency (Raupp & Pinho, 2013b). There
s the understanding that the law is recent and they can have
he excuse that the city councils have not had enough time to
djust themselves yet. However, this is not the first legislation
o require transparency, and it is not at all a new issue. The Fis-
al Responsibility Law and the Transparency Law, passed a few
ears ago, already display some of the demands established by
he Access to Information Law (Raupp & Pinho, 2014). The
roblem of unsuitability and infringement of the Law seems to
e better explained by historical political components and by
olitical culture than by technological reasons (Raupp & Pinho,
013b).
ho  follows  it?
Among the city councils that responded satisfactorily (12),
9 provided the information immediately, as the following: C1,
1, K2, W2, X2, G3, H3, I3 and T3. As the LAI does not specify
 deadline for “immediate access to information”, we took into
ccount those who responded within the first 05 days. The other
ity councils (03) provided the information some time between
he first 05 days and the legal deadline, as the following: D1,
3, and Y3.
In the analysis by region, there is one municipality in the
ortheast, 4 in the South, 6 in the Southeast and one in the Mid-
est. In this group, there is no municipality in the North. The
outh and Southeast Regions together account for 10 municipal-
ties, representing 83.33% of the municipalities that responded
atisfactorily to the researchers’ request. It is a small group of
ity councils that meet the demands for passive transparency.
mong these, some cases deserve mention. The C1 city council
ot only provided a report containing the list of all contracts with
idding waiver in 2014, with details of value and bidding process
ode, but they also highlighted situations that commonly trigger
idding waiver in the city council. The D1 city council already
repares an annual report containing the contracts, detailing the
pecifications of each one. The I3 city council offers a “Citizen
nformation Service”, which, despite requesting the applicant’s
egistration, provided the information in a specific area. Such a
esult seems to indicate a surreal situation in which there is an
nversion between the rule and the exception. The smallest part
f the investigated objects complies with the law. Thus, does the
ule confirm the exception? On the other hand, the result may
lso indicate that, if these city councils responded to the request,
hen it does not seem impossible to meet the law, which leads
o question strongly the reasons for the other city councils not
o meet, or partially or poorly meet the law. Among the city
a
m
u
oource: Research data (2015).
ouncils that comply with the law, three are located in Brazil-
an capitals. Other city councils are located in large cities and
n more developed regions. A similar situation was identified in
he group whose infringement occurred at the source, as seen
arlier.
ynthesis  of  the  passive  (in)transparency  in  city  councils
The empirical evidence presented in the three previous
ections reveals an inventory, not exciting at all, of the pas-
ive (in)transparency in city councils, which is summarized in
able 2.
According to Table 2, 68 (84.81%) city councils of munic-
palities with a population over 300,000 inhabitants present
assive intransparency. These are distributed as follows: for 11
13.92%) city councils, it was not even possible to send the
equest simply for lack of a form; for 56 (70.89%) city councils,
ending the request was possible, however, there was no reply
r the response was insufficient. Only 12 (15.19%) city coun-
ils satisfactorily responded to the request. The findings of this
esearch do not confirm the Silva, Hoch and Santos’s assump-
ion (2013) that, with ICT, especially the Internet, the duty of
assive transparency of the State, mechanism by which citizens
equest access to information, is widely exercised by public pow-
rs, guaranteeing more rapid and less bureaucratic responses.
his leads to confirming the need to separate technology from
he exercise of political participation and transparency. As it
as seen, in some cases, the necessary technology is not even
resent. In others, the majority, the responses are not provided
r, when they are, they are insufficient to meet the request that
as formulated and forwarded to the city councils. Thus, there
eems to be a technological mind (when there is) and a political
ind, the head that thinks of meeting the demands of civil soci-
ty toward increasing transparency. In few cases, as seen, these
inds are aligned, establishing a dialog and proximity.
Analyzing this gap in the light of formalism, it is clear that
here exists distance between the actual conduct and the pre-
cribed standard (Ramos, 1983), which can demonstrate that
changes precede customs, laws anticipate collective practices,
nd their learning ends up being slow and painful” (Machado-
a-Silva, 2003, p. 191). These locations also seem to approach
he patrimonialist model: resistance to modernizing impulses,
f Weberian bureaucracy (professional, meritocratic, imperson-
lity), resistance to the advance of capitalism and, consequently,
aintenance of conservative power structures (patronage, pop-
lism, patriarchy, etc.). Therefore, they also resist the impulses
f accountability (Raupp & Pinho, 2013b). From what was
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bserved in this empirical investigation, the law “struggles to
atch on”, it does not seem to be taken seriously, as pointed out
y Sorj (2001). On one hand, there is a group where not even
inimal technological requirements are implanted, and despite
eing a small group, it is relevant, considering the size of the
unicipalities to which they relate. On the other hand, there is
lso a small group of city councils where the law has effectively
caught on”. In the middle between these two extremes, there
s a wide gray area with 70.89% of the city councils where the
aw seems to fail, occupying a place between the situation of
catching on” and not being taken seriously. Thinking about the
etaphor of the ignition of a car, we can say that it might start
r not. So, complying with the law depends on many factors,
uch as, among others, the development of a civic culture, rising
ducation levels, a more active role of civil society, increased
nforcement (one of the dimensions of accountability), and the
bility to punish the infringers. Seeing all that as an ongoing
rocess, much is still open in Brazilian society.
onclusion
The study aimed to investigate compliance with the require-
ents of passive transparency by city councils of municipalities
ith a population of 300,000 inhabitants or more. Most city
ouncils (84.81%) infringe the legal requirements and are pas-
ively intransparent. Few city councils (15.19%) satisfactorily
esponded the submitted request. Thus, the gap between the
ransparency requirements imposed on government bodies and
he effective compliance by their leaders is not a prerogative of
ctive transparency, but it also occurs with passive transparency,
s this research has showed. And, as an attempt to answer the
nquiries made at the beginning of this article, it is not possi-
le yet to say that passive transparency is a way to mitigate
he failure of governments in relation to transparency of actions
aken in public administration. Moreover, it can be stated that,
s it happens with active transparency, there is also infringe-
ent in relation to passive transparency. The data obtained in
his research seem to be even more worrying when one consid-
rs that the investigation involved the city councils of the largest
unicipalities, expected to be the most developed ones within
he national context.
It is noteworthy that the low level of compliance with the
assive requirements can be explained by the characteristics
f formalism and patrimonialism, discussed in the theoretical
oundation. In addition to formalism and the persistent pat-
imonialism, it seems to be possible to make the following
eflection: passive transparency can be seen as one found in a
ore developed, more participatory society, which is not the case
f Brazilian society. On the other hand, by incorporating Behn’s
eflections, seen above, showing the difficulties of building and
perating accountability, of which transparency is a component,
t could serve as a “consolation”, but it also serves as a warning
aving accountability (and more specifically transparency) con-
aminated by patrimonialism and formalism, i.e., more structural
nd resilient features of the Brazilian social construction.
Thus, the state entities are satisfied to meet the requirements
f the law in general, as it is the case of the LAI. The law
B
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eighs like Damocles’ sword and, for better or worse, there
s an attempt to comply with it. But, what is not established by
he law, what derives from civil society’s initiative, can be seen
s extra, additional work, which these state entities try to avoid.
n the other hand, we identified meeting the demands of civil
ociety in 15.19% of cases. Within a pessimistic perspective,
hese data reveal a scenario that is not encouraging for trans-
arency concerning the law in Brazil. On the other hand, within
 realistic perspective, based on the effective knowledge of how
hings work in Brazil, these data may indicate the existence of
 movement toward passive transparency.
Thus, there is little passive transparency considering the avail-
ble technology, showing, once again, that technology is not
n obstacle to transparency. Even being demanded by legal
equirements, local city councils infringe a series of regula-
ions concerning the transparency of government actions. On
hat path, the study stands out for diagnosing the current situation
f passive transparency in city councils of the largest munici-
alities, revealing how the law, in general, might be infringed,
ot taken seriously. At the same time, sharing a more optimistic
hought, it shows that a process of compliance with the law and
itizenship through passive transparency might be in progress,
hich should be seen as a bearer of good news in Brazilian
istorical trajectory.
Further research, with wider range of municipalities and other
oints of view, for example, in order to identify the factors that
xplain the ability of the local administrations of the largest
unicipalities to build passive transparency, are strongly encour-
ged. That will allow for a better understanding of this issue
ithin this field of knowledge. It is hoped that the findings of
his research can inspire new theoretical and empirical efforts,
ince it is, as the title itself claims, a first diagnosis.
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